The economics profession has an unfortunate tendency to view recent experience in the narrow window provided by standard datasets.
Exploiting the multicentury span of the data, we study the role of repeated extended debt cycles in explaining the observed patterns of serial default and banking crises that characterize the economic history of so many countries-advanced and emerging alike. We test three related hypotheses at both "world" aggregate levels and on an individual country basis. first, external debt surges are a recurring antecedent to banking crises. second, banking crises (both domestic and those emanating from international financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises. Indeed, we find they help predict them. third, public borrowing surges ahead of an external sovereign debt crisis, as governments often have "hidden debts" that far exceed the better documented levels of external debt. These hidden debts include domestic public debt (which was largely undocumented prior to our data) and private debt that becomes public (and publicly known) as the crisis unfolds. 6 A fourth related hypothesis (which we document but do not test) is that during the final stages of the private and public borrowing frenzy on the eve of banking and debt crises and (most notoriously) bursts of hyperinflation, the composition of debt shifts distinctly toward short-term maturities.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our approach toward cataloging, dating, and connecting the various manifestations of economic crises. Here we define the key concepts in our analysis: serial default and the "this time is different" syndrome. Section II presents the big picture on global cycles of debt, financial crises and sovereign debt crises. We use representative country histories to elaborate on and complement some of the patterns seen in the global aggregates. The robustness of the descriptive analysis is grounded in a related Chartbook 8 that spans more than two centuries of data and documents the crisis experience and debt history of each and every one of the 70 countries that make up our sample. We emphasize describing the broad phases of the debt cycle, the sequencing of crises, and some of their features-such as the duration and frequency of default spells. History suggests that policymakers should not be overly cheered by the absence of major external defaults from 2003 to 2009 after the wave of defaults in the preceding two decades. Given that international waves of defaults are typically separated by many years, if not decades, there is no reason to suppose that serial default is dead.
Section III discusses some alternative theoretical frameworks that might help explain the observed patterns discussed in the preceding section with a special emphasis on serial default and the this-time-is-different syndrome. Section IV complements the descriptive big-picture analysis in Section II by exploiting the rich panel dimension of our data to test for temporal causal patterns across crises and the role of public and private debts in the run-up to sovereign debt and financial crises.
I. Crisis Definitions and Other Concepts
We begin by developing working definitions of what constitutes a financial crisis, as well as the methods-quantitative where possible-to date the beginning and end of a crisis. The boundaries drawn are generally consistent with the existing empirical economics literature, which by and large is segmented across the various types of crises considered (e.g., sovereign debt, exchange rate, etc.). Two approaches are used to identify crisis episodes. One, which can be applied to inflation and exchange rates crises, is quantitative in nature, while the other, which we apply to debt and banking crises, is based on a chronology of events. The crisis markers discussed in this section refer to individual countries as opposed to global events.
A. inflation, hyperinflation, and currency crises
Expropriation takes various forms, beyond outright default, repudiation, or the restructuring of domestic or external debts. Indirect routes to achieving the same end-inflation and currency debasement-can also erode the value of some types of existing debts. Thus, we date both the beginning of an inflation or currency crisis episode and its duration. Many of the high-inflation spells can be best described as chronic, in that they last many years. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , which classified exchange rate arrangements for the post-World War II period, used a 12-month inflation threshold of 40 percent or higher to define a "freely falling" episode. Our current work spans a much longer period, before the widespread creation of fiat currency. Median inflation rates before World War I were well below those of the more recent period: 0.5 percent for 1500-1799 and 0.7 percent for 1800-1913 versus about 5 percent for . Accordingly, we define an inflation crisis using a threshold of 20 percent per annum. hyperinflations, which are defined as episodes where the annual inflation rate exceeds 500 percent, are of modern vintage. 9 Hungary 1946 holds the sample's record despite the recent challenge from Zimbabwe, which comes in second. 10 To date currency crashes, we follow a variant of Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose (1996) and focus exclusively on exchange rate depreciation. This definition is the most parsimonious, as it does not rely on other variables, such as reserve losses (data that many central banks guard jealously) and interest rate hikes.
11 Mirroring our treatment of inflation episodes, an episode is counted for the entire period in which annual depreciations exceed the threshold of 15 percent per annum.
Hardly surprising, currency crashes and inflation crises go hand in hand. Figure 1 plots the incidence of the two varieties of monetary, or fiat-money, crises-i.e., exchange rate and inflation crises. The "honor" for the record annual currency crash goes to Greece in 1944, also a year of hyperinflation (see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a) .
B. debt categories and debt crises
External debt crises involve outright default on payment of debt obligations incurred under foreign legal jurisdiction, including nonpayment, repudiation, or the restructuring of debt into terms less favorable to the lender than in the original contract.
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These events have received considerable attention in the academic literature from leading modern-day economic historians, such as Bordo, Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, Lindert and Morton, and Taylor. 13 Relative to early banking crises, much is known about the causes and consequences of these rather dramatic episodes. For post-1824, the dates come from several Standard and Poor's studies. However, these are incomplete, missing numerous postwar restructurings and early defaults. This source has been supplemented with additional information from Morton (1989), Christian Suter (1992) and Michael Tomz (2007) . Of course, required reading in this field includes Max Winkler (1933) and William H. Wynne (1951) .
While the time of default is accurately classified as a crisis year, in a large number of cases the final resolution with the creditors (if it ever does take place) seems interminable. Russia's default following the revolution holds the record, lasting 69 years. Greece's default in 1826 shut it out from international capital markets for Notes: An inflation crisis is defined as a year when inflation exceeds 20 percent, while a currency crash is an annual depreciation (devaluation) greater than or equal to 15 percent per annum. The correlations of inflation and exchange rate crises are contemporaneous.
sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , sources cited therein, and authors' calculations. 1906 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006 Looking at the full default episode is, of course, useful for characterizing the borrowing/default cycles, calculating hazard rates, etc. But it is hardly credible that a spell of 53 years could be considered a crisis. Thus, in addition to constructing the country-specific dummy variables to cover the entire episode, we also employ one where only the first year of default enters as a crisis.
Information on domestic debt crises is scarce, but it is not because these crises do not take place.
14 Indeed, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) show, domestic debt crises typically occur against much worse economic conditions than the average external default. Domestic debt crises do not usually involve external creditors, which may help explain why so many episodes go unnoticed. Another feature that characterizes domestic defaults is that references to arrears or suspension of payments on sovereign domestic debt are often relegated to the footnotes of data tables. Lastly, some of the domestic defaults that involved the forcible conversion of foreign currency deposits into local currency have occurred during banking crises, hyperinflations, or a combination of the two; deposit freezes are also numerous. Our approach toward constructing categorical variables follows that previously described for external debt default. Like banking crises and unlike external debt defaults, the endpoint of domestic default is not always known.
C. Banking crises
Due to the paucity of quantitative information, our analysis stresses events when dating banking crises. For example, the relative price of bank stocks (or financial institutions relative to the market) would be a logical indicator to examine, but such time series are not readily available, particularly for the earlier part of our sample as well as for developing countries (where many banks are not publicly traded).
If the beginning of a banking crisis is marked by bank runs and withdrawals, then changes in bank deposits could be used to date the crisis. This indicator would certainly have done well in dating the numerous banking panics of the 1800s. Often, however, the banking problems do not arise from the liability side, but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, be it from a collapse in real estate prices or increased bankruptcies in the nonfinancial sector. In such cases, a large increase in bankruptcies or nonperforming loans would better mark the onset of the crisis. Unfortunately, indicators of business failures and nonperforming loans are also usually available only sporadically; the latter are also made less informative by banks' desire to hide their problems for as long as possible.
Given these data limitations, we mark a banking crisis by two types of events: (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; or (ii) if there are no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other financial institutions.
The main sources for cross-country dating of crises are as follows: for post-1970, the comprehensive and well-known study by Gerard Caprio and Daniela Klingebiel-updated by them through 2003-is authoritative, especially when it comes to classifying banking crises into systemic or more benign categories (see also : Caprio et al. 2005) . For pre-World War II, Charles P. Kindleberger (1989) , and Bordo et al. (2001) , among others, provide multicountry coverage on banking crises. For many of the early episodes it is difficult to ascertain how long the crisis lasted. Many country-specific studies pick up banking crisis episodes not covered by the multicountry literature and contribute importantly to this chronology. D. the "this-time-is-different" syndrome and serial default serial default refers to countries which experience multiple sovereign defaults (on external or domestic, public or publicly guaranteed debt, or both). These defaults may occur five or 50 years apart; they may be wholesale default (or repudiation) or a partial default through rescheduling.
The essence of the this-time-is-different syndrome is simple. It is rooted in the firmly held belief that financial crisis is something that happens to other people in other countries at other times; crises do not happen here and now to us. We are doing things better, we are smarter, we have learned from past mistakes. The old rules of valuation no longer apply. The current boom, unlike the many previous booms that preceded catastrophic collapses (even in our country), is built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. Or so the story goes …
II. The Big Picture and Country Histories
What are some basic insights one gains from this panoramic view of the history of financial crises? Our approach throughout this section is to illustrate each of our main findings with both a big picture based on cross-country aggregation and a representative-country case study (or case studies) from country histories. Each of the main points highlighted in the figures is complemented by the pertinent debt/GDP crisis indicator regressions reported at the bottom of each figure. We begin by discussing sovereign default on external debt (that is, when a government defaults on its own external debt or on private-sector debts that were publicly guaranteed).
A. sovereign debt crises
For the world as a whole (more than 90 percent of global GDP is represented by our dataset), the 2003-2009 period can be seen as a typical lull that follows large global financial crises. The first is during the Napoleonic War. The second runs from the 1820s through the late 1840s, when, at times, nearly half the countries in the world were in default (including all of Latin America). The third episode begins in the early 1870s and lasts for two decades. The fourth episode begins in the Great Depression of the 1930s and extends through the early 1950s, when nearly half of all countries stood in default.
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The most recent default cycle encompasses the emerging market debt crises of the 1980s and 1990s.
Public debt follows a lengthy and repeated boom-bust cycle; the bust phase involves a markedly higher incidence of sovereign debt crises. Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis nears. In the aggregate, debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.
16 Figure 3 plots the incidence of default shown in Figure 2 from 1824, (when the newly independent Latin American economies first entered the global capital market) through 2010, against an unweighted average debt/GDP ratio for all the countries for which such data are available. Upturns in the debt ratio usually precede the rise in default rates, as the regressions for the world aggregates (shown at the bottom of Figure 3 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 confirm. The evident positive correlation between rising debt burdens and higher incidence of default will be investigated more systematically in Section IV. Periods of higher indebtedness also appear to be associated with a higher incidence of inflation crises (an indirect form of default, highlighted as a darker shaded bar where the incidence of inflation exceeds that of default). Default through inflation has been more prevalent since World War I, as fiat money became the norm and links to gold eroded. Figure 4 presents the comparable time series and regression analysis for emerging markets. The pattern between debt and default are along the lines already discussed in the context of the world aggregate shown in Figure 3 . 17 Notably absent in Figure   17 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) for evidence on the debt thresholds that are associated with higher inflation outcomes. 
Notes:
The debt aggregate for the world is a simple arithmetic average of individual countries' debt/GDP ratios. For a few countries the time series on debt and exports are much longer, dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century, than for nominal GDP. In these cases (Brazil, Canada, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay) the debt/GDP series was spliced (with appropriate scaling) to the available debt/GDP data. The split between advanced and emerging economies is made along the present-day IMF classification. a The specification of the fractional logit allows for a dependent variable to be bounded (fractional) not binary as in the standard logit functional form (see Leslie E. Papke and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge 1996) . sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , sources cited therein, and authors' calculations. 1906 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 2006 4 are the debt spikes during the two world wars evident in Figure 3 , highlighting that (with the exception of the European emerging markets) the fiscal finances of emerging markets were not adversely affected by these events. serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several advanced economies. Figure 1 anticipates this point by the numerous episodes (shaded) in which at least 20 percent of the independent nations were in default. The most compelling evidence on serial default comes from the individual country histories, shown here for Brazil and Greece in Figures 5 and 6 , respectively. The 70 country histories presented in the Chartbook provide broad-based evidence that serial default cuts across regions and across time.
The hallmark surge in debt on the eve of a debt crisis, banking crisis, or both are quite evident in most of the episodes in the timeline for Brazil and for Greece's two defaults in 1894 and in 1932-the latter default spell lasting about 33 years from the beginning to its eventual resolution in 1964.
Another noteworthy insight from the panoramic view is that the median duration of default spells in the post-World War ii period is one-half the length of what it was during 1800-1945 (three years versus six years, as shown in Figure 7 ). sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , sources cited therein, and authors' calculations. 1906 1916 1926 1936 1946 1956 1966 1976 1986 1996 A charitable interpretation is that crisis resolution mechanisms have improved since the bygone days of gunboat diplomacy. After all, Newfoundland lost nothing less than its sovereignty when it defaulted on its external debts in 1936 and ultimately became a Canadian province; Egypt, among others, became a British "protectorate" following its 1876 default. A more cynical explanation points to the possibility that, when bailouts are facilitated by deep-pocketed multilateral lenders such as the International Monetary Fund, creditors are willing to cut more slack to their serial-defaulting clients.
The fact remains that, as Bordo and Eichengreen (1999) observe, the number of years separating default episodes in the more recent period is much lower. Once debt is restructured, countries are quick to releverage (see Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003 , for empirical evidence on this pattern). sources: Reinhart (2010) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) and sources cited therein. 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 Defaults ( Figure 8 with Belgium's chronology since 1835 but is systematically documented in Reinhart (2010) , the Chartbook.
The world's financial centers, the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, stand out in this regard, with 12, 13, and 15 banking crisis episodes, respectively. The frequency of banking crises drops off markedly for both the advanced economies and the larger emerging markets post-World War II. However, all except Portugal experienced at least one postwar crisis prior to the current episode. When the late-2000s crises are fully factored in, the apparent drop will likely be even less pronounced. Indeed, as discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, 2011) , despite dramatic differences in recent sovereign default performance, the incidence of bank- Figure 7 ). a The first 17-year default period involves two default episodes.
sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) and sources cited therein. 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004 Banking crisis begins in 1931 (black line) and default in 1932. It was the last of 6 default episodes (shaded). ing crises is about the same for advanced economies as for emerging markets. It also should be noted that as financial markets have developed in the smaller, poorer economies, the frequency of banking crises has increased.
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Ahead of banking crises, private debts (external debt, broader private capital inflows, domestic bank debt) also display a repeated cycle of boom and bust-the run-up in debts accelerates as the crisis nears.
It is certainly true that having debts (public or private) is a prerequisite to default. However, what we are describing here is not a tautology. The pattern that emerges is not indicative of a gradual (linear) accumulation of debt in advance of a banking crisis or a sovereign default. Specifically, when we discuss rising debts ahead of the crisis we are referring to surges in capital inflow ("bonanzas" as defined in Reinhart and Reinhart 2009) or, more generally, in any kind of debt (domestic or external). This nonlinear pattern in borrowing ahead of banking and debt crises (as these often overlap) is documented in its multiple manifestations in Figures 9 through 13.
The total external debt (public plus private) of emerging markets over 1970-2009 is presented in Figure 9 . The shading indicates the incidence of default while the black bars represent the incidence of systemic banking crises. The regressions (shown below the figure) confirm what the visual inspection of the time series plotted in the figure suggests. Increases in external debt systematically help predict Notes: The duration of a default spell is the number of years from the year of default to the year of resolution, be it through restructuring, repayment, or debt forgiveness. The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for comparing the equality of two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions at the 1 percent significance level. increases in the share of countries in default and the comparable share of emerging markets with systemic banking crises. The small inset in Figure 9 also depicts a similar surge in public and private external debts (comparably defined) for the 22 advanced economies in our sample over the decade leading to the global financial crisis which began with the subprime debacle in the United States in 2007. In effect, the average external debt/GDP ratio doubles during this period. The year 2008 is the advanced-economy counterpart to the years 1981 and 1998 for emerging markets. An extensive number of episodes that are documented in the Chartbook display this prototype pattern. One of the most dramatic external debt buildups recorded since World War II is that of Iceland, shown in Figure 10 for the 1922-2009 period.
In light of the preceding discussion of the time profile of external debt before, during, and following debt and banking crises, it is hardly surprising that capital flows display the boom-bonanza phase in the years prior to the crisis and the Dornbusch-Calvotype sudden stop syndrome 19 just before or during the year of the crisis (even in crisis episodes of an earlier century and in advanced economies). Figures 11 and 12 , which show public and private capital flows from the United Kingdom to Latin America and the United States, respectively, for 1865-1914, both exemplify this behavior.
Like every other measure of indebtedness that we could find, domestic credit climbs sharply prior to a banking crisis and unwinds afterward. sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) and sources cited therein.
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C. Banking and debt crises
Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises. The reasons for this temporal sequence may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and formalized in Velasco (1987) , in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus undermining its own solvency. 20 The currency crashes that are an integral part of the "twin crisis"
20 See Cristina Arellano and Narayana R. Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics. phenomenon documented by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) would also be consistent with this temporal pattern. If, as they suggest, banking crises precede currency crashes, the collapsing value of the domestic currency that comes after a banking crisis begins may undermine the solvency of both private and sovereign borrowers who are unfortunate enough to have important amounts of foreign-currency debts.
Even absent large-scale bailouts (and without counting the postcrisis new government guarantees), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b) argue that, largely owing to collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise about 86 percent in the three years following a systemic financial crisis, setting the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst-case scenario, default. Other possible explanations are contemplated in the next section, which reviews the theoretical literature on crises with an eye to emphasizing frameworks that are most helpful in shedding light on some of the empirical regularities described in this section.
A causal chain from sovereign debt crisis to banking crisis, perhaps obscured in these simple graphs, cannot be dismissed lightly. Financial repression and international capital controls may give the government scope to coerce otherwise healthy banks to buy government debt in significant quantities. (China's prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s, associated with nearly bankrupt state-owned enterprises, is an example of this problem.) A government default, in those circumstances, would directly impact the banks' balance sheets. The two crises may be more or less simultaneous. But even if banks are not overly exposed to government paper, the "sovereign ceiling," in which corporate borrowers are rated no higher than their national governments, may make banks' offshore borrowing very costly or altogether impossible. The result would be a sudden stop that could give rise to bank insolvencies either immediately or subsequently.
Ultimately, the issue of temporal precedence is an empirical one that will be discussed in more detail in Section IV. 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 
D. observations on the composition of debts
To shed light on the maturity composition of external debt (public and private) around financial crises in aggregate, Figure 15 plots the share of short-term debt during 1970-2009 for emerging markets, where our external debt data is most complete. The vertical lines single out years in which the incidence of banking crises (black lines) and sovereign defaults (shaded) was highest (20 percent or more of all countries were engulfed in crisis). As the figure illustrates, short-term debts escalate on the eve of banking crises; the ratio of short-term to total debt about doubles from 12 to 24 percent. Regardless of whether the rise in short-term debt reflects growing reluctance by lenders to extend longer term debt, or opportunism during a boom, a higher short-term debt ratio exposes a country to greater risk of a self-fulfilling panic, as we discuss more fully in Section III. A similar pattern emerges in the run-up to sovereign defaults (which in this particular exercise immediately follow banking crises). Many individual crisis episodes are equally, or possibly even more, compelling; see Figure 16 on Indonesia. The small table inset in Figure 10 , which The bottom panel tallies the number of banking and currency crises for the six countries that are capital inflow recipients. If each of the six countries had had both a banking crisis and a default (new or ongoing), the sum of these would be 12; the year with the largest number of crises is 1890 during the Barings episode. Exchange rate crashes and inflation crises (which often coincide with default and banking crises) are not included in these calculations.
sources: Irving Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , and sources cited therein. shows external debt for Iceland over 1922-2009, also reveals a striking increase in the share of short-term debt as the crisis approaches, rising from about 17 to 49 percent. In the march toward hyperinflation, it is not unusual to see long-term debt disappear altogether. Several episodes from the country histories (including the famous German hyperinflation of 1923-1924) corroborate this pattern. The inset to Figure 5 on the eve of hyperinflation in late-1980s Brazil is yet another entry in this long list. Private debts become public debts after the crisis. Several examples from the debt crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are documented in various figures in the Chartbook. 21 Along the lines shown in Figure  16 (inset), the precrisis surge in indebtedness is in the private sectors.
III. Theoretical Underpinnings of the This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome
Our results raise the question of how to explain the remarkable universality of serial default and serial financial crises across time, place, cultures, institutions, and political systems. As such, the roots are almost surely buried deep in human and social behavior, in areas where modern economics has only scratched the surface. Nevertheless, existing economic theory provides important suggestive results. 21 See, for instance, the experiences of El Salvador and Ecuador, in which nearly all postcrisis debts were public. sources: Stone (1999) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , and sources cited therein.
A. multiple Equilibria Rationales
Multiple equilibrium models, and related refinements, would appear to offer an explanation of one central feature of the this-time-is-different syndrome: it is typically much easier to identify when an economy is vulnerable to a financial crisis than to assess the probability or the timing of the collapse. The generic multiple equilibria model is a variant of Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig's (1983) analysis of bank runs. Their analysis suggests that any entity that uses short-term borrowing to fund holdings of illiquid assets can be vulnerable to crises of confidence (runs), that occur essentially when massive unexpected withdrawals of short-term lending force premature liquidation of long-term projects at deep discount. Models that explain government debt crises as arising from multiple equilibria include Jeffrey Sachs (1984) ; Calvo (1988) ; and Maurice Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, ch. 6) , among others. Even those models that yield a unique equilibrium (e.g., the bargaining theoretic sovereign debt model of Jeremy Bulow and Rogoff 1989) , often do so only under fairly restrictive assumptions and are subject to multiple equilibria for more general versions. In addition to bank runs and sovereign debt crises, there is also a large literature suggesting multiple equilibria models of inflation and exchange rate crises (e.g., Obstfeld 1994) .
At one level, the multiple equilibria explanation of the this-time-is-different syndrome has some very attractive features. Multiple equilibria in financial markets, especially debt markets, are fairly generic, and therefore consistent with the nearuniversality of crises. The buildup in short-term debt we observed on the eve of financial crises (perhaps to economize on interest rate costs as debt rises) certainly increases a country's vulnerability to panics and runs. During the boom, politicians and investors could misinterpret a "high-trade" outcome among a set of potential equilibria as evidence of permanently changed circumstances. With such a thistime-is-different mentality, they would not recognize that the economy has its back to a proverbial cliff, until it is too late. Moreover, "sunspot" triggers to such crises, as they may be related to investor confidence, could potentially hit many countries at once.
Unfortunately, multiple equilibria models have their limitations. Absent a model of the underlying sunspots, it is difficult to assess the degree of risk across different economies. True, there have been important efforts to refine multiple equilibria models to strengthen their explanatory power, starting with Stephen 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Notes:
The debt aggregates for the advanced economies and the world are simple arithmetic averages (not weighted by a country's share in world GDP) of individual countries' debt/GDP ratios. For a few countries the time series on debt and exports are much longer, dating back to the first half of the nineteenth century, than for nominal GDP. In these cases (Brazil, Canada, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Thailand, Turkey, and Uruguay) the debt/GDP series was spliced (with appropriate scaling) to the available debt/GDP data. The split between advanced and emerging economies is made along the present-day IMF classification, even though several countries, such as New Zealand, were emerging markets during most of the pre-World War I period.
sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) , sources cited therein, and authors' calculations. Morris and Hyun Song Shin (2001) , but the results can be sensitive to difficultto-confirm underlying assumptions, such as the importance of public relative to private information.
B. short-term Biases that Allow crisis Risks to Build up
But even setting aside the difficulty of testing or applying multiple equilibria models of financial crises, multiple equilibria analyses beg the deeper question of why politicians, regulators, and, indeed, voters do not take steps to reduce their economy's vulnerability. Why don't the politicians who take on huge foreign debt burdens better incorporate the long-term risks to stability and growth? Why, as debt burdens grow, do politicians prefer to shift borrowing to shorter maturities (to save on interest payments) rather than promote early adjustment to reduce the risk of catastrophe?
22 Why is regulation so often procyclical towards the end of a boom when it should be obvious that financial regulation typically needs to become stricter not easier? If economies with high levels of short-term debt are particularly vulnerable, why do governments sometimes adopt tax and financial policies that seem to promote it?
Although it does not address the exact question we ask here, there is certainly an important political economy literature on debt bias. For example, Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini (1990) as well as Torsten Persson and Lars E. O. Svensson (1989) develop models where incumbents tend to run large deficits essentially because the temporary nature of their term in office raises their effective discount rate. In a related approach, Manuel Amador (2008) sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2008, 2009a) and sources cited therein. 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 by different interest groups can lead to a tragedy-of-the-commons situation in which short-term expenditures are favored at the expense of longer term fiscal sustainability. Amador (2003) , building on David Laibson (1997) , shows how politicians' limited horizons can fundamentally change the market for sovereign debt. Recent quantitative analyses of sovereign default, including, for example, Mark Aguiar and Gita Gopinath (2006) , suggest that high discount rates for governments are a key element of any cogent explanation of the borrowing and default cycle.
Other political economy factors can also be important in explaining short-termism in financial governance, as we argued in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) . During a boom, the financial sector becomes richer and more influential. Often the result is reduced regulation that raises the financial sector's profitability at the expense of greater crisis risk for society as a whole.
C. hidden debt
Our results here, as well as a plethora of vivid examples from the accompanying Chartbook, suggest that more attention needs to be paid to hidden debts and liabilities. In a crisis, government debt burdens often come pouring out of the woodwork, exposing solvency issues about which the public seemed blissfully unaware. One important example is the way governments routinely guarantee the debt of quasigovernment agencies that may be taking on a great deal of risk, most notably as was the case of the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States prior to the 2007 crisis. Indeed, in many economies, the range of implicit government guarantees is breathtaking. As we emphasize in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a) , many governments find in a crisis that they are forced to deal not only with their external debts (owed to foreigners) but with those of private domestic borrowers as well. Famously, Thailand (1997) , just prior to its financial crisis, kept hidden its massive forward exchange market interventions that ultimately led to huge losses. 1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 Even for plain vanilla government debt, governments rarely make it easy to obtain the kind of time series data one would require to meaningfully assess vulnerability (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a, 2011) . Hidden debt has loomed large in many sovereign defaults over history. At the time of this writing one only has to read the debacle in the financial press concerning Greece's hidden debts, conveniently facilitated by its underwriter Goldman Sachs. For many more comparable examples, the interested reader is referred to Max Winkler (1933) .
In principle, of course, lenders should realize the huge temptation for borrowers to hide the true nature of their balance sheet. Private information on debt can, in principle, be incorporated into the models. 23 However, the many different margins on which governments can cheat are a significant complicating factor. In any event, the importance of hidden debt in many financial crises suggests further work is needed to better understand its role in the this-time-is-different syndrome.
D. further models of Leverage and Behavior
Our list of potential crisis models is far from complete. For example, Ana Fostel and John Geanakoplos's (2008) analysis of leverage cycles is another potentially promising avenue of research.
Even taking together all these promising strands of the political economy and financial crisis literature, one suspects there are still large gaps in our understanding of the arrogance and ignorance that underlie most financial crises-to reiterate, a reading of Winkler (1933) is highly recommended. The ignorance, of course, stems from the belief that financial crises happen to other people at other times in other places. Outside a small number of experts, few people fully appreciate the universality of financial crises. The arrogance is of those who believe they have figured out how to do things better and smarter so that the boom can long continue without a crisis. 24 Here, modern behavioral economics can hopefully contribute new perspectives. For example, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (1982) provide examples of overconfidence in the sense of underestimating the variability of future shocks. Such false confidence could lead agents to hold insufficient buffer stocks of assets or, equivalently, to hold too much debt. Alternatively, leaders and voters may simply be overconfident (for example, as suggested by Colin Camerer and Dan Lovallo 1999) . 25 We do not pretend to be able to synthesize all these diverse literatures, but clearly the this-time-is-different syndrome is an extremely important phenomenon (a "hardy perennial," as Kindleberger famously remarked about financial crises) that needs further clarification and study.
IV. Debt, Banking Crises, and Default: Cross-Country Evidence
In Section II, we presented evidence based on both cross-country aggregates and individual country histories that suggests a strong connection between debt 23 An early attempt to model borrowing when lenders do not know aggregate debt is Kenneth M. Kletzer (1984) . 24 See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, ch. 1) for examples of the this-time-is-different mentality over the ages. 25 The authors are grateful to David Laibson for suggesting these references. cycles and economic crises. Specifically, we noted that: (i) public debts rise markedly as a sovereign debt crisis draws near; (ii) private debts exhibit a similar nonlinear buildup ahead of banking crises; and (iii) public debts may or may not contribute to the precrisis surge in indebtedness on the eve of banking crises. Furthermore, banking and debt crises often occur simultaneously (or in proximity to one another) and, more often than not, banking crises anticipate (temporally precede) debt crises.
In this section, we investigate these postulated relationships more systematically. We also test the hypothesis that systemic financial crises in global financial centers (the United Kingdom and the United States) potentially increase the odds of a banking crisis, debt crisis, or both, in other countries. Our rich panel data spans 70 advanced and emerging economies over a period of more than 200 years (1800-2009). The full sample includes 290 banking crises and 209 sovereign default episodes; there are a total of about 14,700 observations. Recognizing that a sample that stretches over such a long horizon is bound to be riddled with structural change, we are careful to reexamine the relationships of interest over several subperiods.
A. Banking and debt crises: temporal Patterns
The causal direction between banking and debt crises can potentially run in either or both directions. As noted earlier, the prevalent pattern emerging from the country histories appears to suggest that banking crises come before debt crises. The causality tests employed here mimic the spirit of the standard vector autoregression (VAR) setup. The specification employed here looks for temporal precedence using a logit specification, which of course is highly nonlinear. Both variables (banking and debt crisis dummies) are treated as potentially endogenous, which can be explained (or not) by its own lagged values and the lagged values of the second variable. We include as additional (exogenous) regressor the financial crisis dummy for the global financial center and allow the intercept to vary depending on whether the country is an advanced or emerging market.
The first twist to the standard VAR is that both variables are dichotomous, so our preferred method of estimation is a multinomial logit; the second twist is that to reduce collinearity, rather than include multiple lagged terms, we use a single lag of a three-year backward-looking moving average. Hence, our simple two-equation system is given by, where Bc t and dc t are dummy variables that take on a value of one in the first year of a domestic banking crisis and the first year of a sovereign debt crisis, respectively. Bc t-1 to t-3 and dc t-1 to t-3 are three-year moving averages of the two crisis variables, β k , k = AE, Em, which are the intercept terms for advanced economies (AE) and emerging markets (Em). The financial center crisis is given by fc t , and u 1t and u 2t are the error terms.
Variations of the model presented in (1) and (2) that restrict the intercept to being the same for all countries, that allow the intercept to vary by region, and that incorporate a fixed effect for all 70 countries, were also estimated but were not reported in order to conserve space. 26 In addition to logit, (1)-(2) were estimated using OLS and OLS with robust errors. The results described in what follows were consistent across specifications and estimation strategies. Table 1 reports the results for the specification given by (1)-(2) for the full sample for 1824-2009, 1900-2009, and 1946-2009. 27 Significant coefficients are shown in bold italics; p-values are reported in all cases. The main results, irrespective of which sample period or estimation strategy is selected, are that systemic banking 26 We also estimated the same model for the full crisis period-rather than the first year only. The main result was that the lagged dependent variables came in significant; this is hardly surprising in light of the fact that both banking and debt crises are mostly multiyear phenomena. 27 Other subsamples are available from the authors upon request. crises, in financial centers help explain domestic banking crises, and domestic banking crises help explain sovereign default.
B. Public and External debt, default and Banking crises
Beyond the causal pattern between the three dichotomous events considered, we now include a debt/GDP measure as a regressor in equations (1) and (2). For the longer sample, it is total public debt (domestic plus external), Pd_Y t ; for the post-1970 period we also consider external (public plus private) debt for the emerging market subgroup, Ed_Y Emt . It is worth noting that public debt is measured with error, as implicit guarantees and other hidden debts are not captured in the official data used here, and that such hidden debts also tend to rise markedly in the vicinity Adding the public debt variable does not alter any of the aforementioned temporal patterns. Banking crises in financial centers are still significant in the domestic banking crisis equation, as Table 2 highlights. Debt crises remain statistically insignificant. The three-year change in public debt/GDP enters the banking crisis equation significantly only for the most recent subsample. On the basis of a careful review of the country histories that connect banking crises to surges in private debt, these results are not surprising.
Turning to the debt crisis equation, domestic banking crises continue to be a significant predictor of debt crises, while crises in the financial center have no direct independent effect (obviously, there is an indirect link through a systematic relationship with domestic banking crises). Surges in public debt have the expected significant positive effect on the likelihood of default, although it appears that the relationship is somewhat weaker for the 1946-2009 subsample.
External (public and private) debt for the period over which this data is available (1970-2009) significantly increased the chances of a banking crisis but had no systematic direct impact on the probability of default (Table 3) , which continues to depend significantly on whether there is a banking crisis or not.
V. Concluding Observations
Our analysis here has only scratched the surface of what the expansive new database underlying this paper might ultimately yield. Among many diverse avenues for future research, it would be interesting to explore the link between inflation crises and public debt (the most novel feature of our dataset) suggested in Figures 3 and 4. 28 This is possibly a fruitful issue to explore in future research. 29 The same exercise was performed using t-1 to t-3, t-1 to t-2, and t-1 only with very similar results. Here we have chosen to focus particularly on some of the links between debt cycles and the recurrent pattern of banking and sovereign debt crises over the past two centuries. Banking crises are importantly preceded by rapidly rising private indebtedness. But, perhaps more surprisingly, our analysis suggests that banking crises (even those of a purely private origin) increase the likelihood of a sovereign default. We find a direct effect (perhaps in part due to the recession that typically arises) as well as an indirect effect (perhaps due to the typical post-banking crisis explosion in public debt). There is little to suggest in this analysis that debt cycles and their connections with economic crises have changed appreciably over time.
Appendix: Debt Glossary
External debt: total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors, both official (public) and private. Creditors often determine all the terms of the debt contracts, which are normally subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign creditors or to international law (for multilateral credits).
Total government debt (total public debt): total debt liabilities of a government with both domestic and foreign creditors. The "government" normally comprises the central administration, provincial governments, federal governments, and all other entities that borrow with an explicit government guarantee.
Government domestic debt: all debt liabilities of a government that are issued under-and subject to-national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the creditor or the currency denomination of the debt (therefore it includes government foreign-currency domestic debt, as defined below). Terms of the debt contracts can be market-determined or set unilaterally by the government.
Government foreign-currency domestic debt: debt liabilities of a government issued under national jurisdiction that are nonetheless expressed in (or linked to) a currency different from the national currency of the country.
Central bank debt: not usually included under government debt (despite the fact that it usually carries an implicit government guarantee). Central banks usually issue such debt to facilitate open market operations (including sterilized intervention). Such debts may be denominated in either local or foreign currency. Domestic debt: liabilities of the public and private sector under domestic law. These comprise government domestic debt (see above) and private debts, which for most countries in our sample are dominated by debts of households and firms contracted through domestic banking institutions. In our analysis we do not include data on nonbank domestic debts (i.e., domestic corporate bonds and commercial paper).
Hidden debt: this is not an accounting definition as in the previous categories of debt. Hidden debt includes contingent liabilities of the government. Historically, domestic debt (see above) has in many countries been a major part of hidden debt.
In addition, these could be (i) explicit guarantees (in which case they are not entirely hidden); while we have not come across any public debt time series that quantify such guarantees, more recent measures of government guarantees are now published under the International Monetary Fund's Standard Data Dissemination System (SDDS) framework; (ii) implicit guarantees which could extend to all kinds of private sector debts; (iii) debts of the central bank (see above); (iv) off-balance-sheet debts that arise from transactions in derivative markets; (v) last, but not least, any liability of the government not included in official debt statistics (thus official statistics would understate true public sector indebtedness) and not already included in (i)-(iv) above. After all, if we knew what these debts were, they would not be hidden. (See discussion in Section III.)
